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Abstract 
In recent sociological studies of markets, especially financial markets, researchers have ar-
gued that economics is performative (MacKenzie, Callon et al.). By this they refer to the ob-
servation that theories such as the Black-Scholes formula do not simply describe reality, but 
contributed to the regulatory creation of financial markets in which the agents started to adopt 
behavioral patterns that correspond to the theory, also relying on artefacts that have been cre-
ated by the originators of the theory. This notion of performativity fits also other recent uses 
of language theory in economics, such as the theory of organizational forms in organizational 
ecology (Carroll and Hannan) or John Searle’s theory of institutions. The paper builds on this, 
especially Searle’s approach, and explores the underlying cognitive operations. It is argued 
that performativity builds on the human capacity to generate new meanings from existing 
concepts. This is elaborated in the theory of conceptual blending that has been developed by 
Fauconnier and Turner. For example, blends are a typical phenomenon in the emergence of 
new business models, such as in the dotcom bubble. The theory of conceptual blending can be 
based on neuroscientific insights into the operations of the human brain, corresponding to 
Searle’s proposal to ground institutions in neurophysiological dispositions. 
Key words: Searle’s theory of institutions, financial markets, emergence of novelty, concep-
tual blending, neural theory of metaphor 
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1   Introduction: The status of reality in economics 
 
For many observers, the recent financial crisis is also a crisis of economics. There are more 
specific and more general criticisms of this kind, for example, relating with the failure of eco-
nomics to predict the crisis, or with the need to include more behavioral parameters into the 
description of agents on financial markets. One of the most general criticism is that economics 
simply turned out to be wrong as a description of economic reality, such as, for example, in its 
treatment of the underlying stochastic structure of financial markets (Mandelbrot and Hudson, 
2008). 
I have qualms with such kind of criticism, because it does not really define what economic 
reality is. There is a clear difference between the stochastic structure of climate when it comes 
to agricultural economics, and the stochastic structure of financial markets. In the latter case, 
we deal with an artificial object that does not exist independently from human action and cog-
nition. Stock markets are not apple trees. In the most simple fashion, we might say that a 
stock market is an institutional structure, which comes into existence via an act of institutional 
creation, e.g. by actions of lawmakers. In a more complex way, we could describe a stock 
market as the empirical phenomenon that arises from human actions taking place under that 
institutional framework, thus generating a wide variety of intended and unintended conse-
quences. This empirical phenomenon manifests certain stochastic properties, which, as we 
have learned repeatedly, we do not fully understand. It is precisely our ignorance about the 
complex systems that human beings create that leads us to regard those as a reality that is in-
dependent from us, and which can be further investigated by means of objective methods in 
science. 
In recent economic sociology, the notion of performativity has been proposed to deal analyti-
cally with this special kind of relation between human action and reality (for a survey, see 
Callon 2007). Performativity is a term borrowed from the philosophy of language. In a sense, 
in economics, this theoretical step reflects the transition from the theory of ideal formal lan-
guages to the analysis of ordinary language that was pushed by philosophers such as Wittgen-
stein and Austin in the 1950s of the last century (for a survey, see Lycan 1999). The situation A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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in economics is similar until today. In the past, economics focused on the development of 
ideal formal languages, such as general equilibrium theories, which were intended to work 
both in the normative and, somewhat awkwardly, in the positive sense. A general equilibrium 
theory is primarily intended to describe an ideal economy, which is a stripped-down version 
of real economies, and which is intended to work in a perfect way. At the same time, how-
ever, it is also regarded as a description of the essential core mechanism in real world econo-
mies, such as in the case of Computable GE models in econometrics. In a similar fashion, 
theories of the ideal language were explicitly designed to construct languages which do not 
manifest the many weaknesses and imperfections of natural languages. But at the same time, 
they were seen as building on logics, and this in turn was seen as an essential property also of 
human mind as a real world phenomenon.  
The philosophy of ordinary language questioned all this and made a very simple point right at 
the beginning: This is to observe that natural languages do not only include sentences to 
which a truth value can be assigned, which were the exclusive focus on ideal languages. In 
contrast, one could even say that the majority of utterances in spoken human language are 
non-descriptive, such as giving orders, expressing sorrow, or giving a promise. This insight 
gave rise to many new approaches in the philosophy of language. One was speech act theory 
(overview in Green 2009). In this theory, there is an important class of utterances which are 
performative. This means, that the utterance creates a social fact, such as declaring a country 
independent or declaring a student to receive a degree. 
Subsequently, I wish to analyze this notion of performativity in economics. In doing this, I go 
far beyond the current sociology of economics. In its context, the main interest is in under-
standing how the science of economics does actually perform the economy. This is now a 
well-researched, though contested field (for an important collection of papers, see MacKenzie 
et al. 2007). My perspective is different. I accept this approach in the sense that I presume that 
at least some theories in economics are performative. But I extend this notion to include per-
formative statements in general, which might be involved in the creation of markets and eco-
nomic systems. I do this by referring to John Searle’s theory of institutions, thus merging two 
different strands of thinking, which, however, share a common reference point, as John Searle 
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Having done this in the second section of the paper, I enact a shift towards cognitive science, 
which is the topic of the third section of the paper. This is because the notion of performativ-
ity needs to build on a particular cognitive capacity, in particular metaphor. This is easy to 
understand if one recognizes that a performative utterance normally implies to treat something 
as something else, such as two lovers as a married couple in the performative act of marriage.  
Once this step towards the cognitive sciences is taken, doors are wide open to consider the 
possible role of the brain sciences in the theory of performativity. I go through this door in the 
fourth section, which is highly speculative. The question is whether we can identify a neu-
ronal correlate to the theory of metaphor which has been outlined in section three. I think so, 
and I try to argue that we need such a neuroscientific counterpart to account for the phenome-
non of creativity in performative acts. This leads to the conclusion that performativity is an 
aspect of economic reality in the sense of externalism. Externalism is a foundational position 
in the philosophy of mind which posits that mental processes are impossible to conceive 
without an essential connectedness between inner and outer processes, as far the boundaries 
of the mind/body are concerned. This corresponds to the sociological applications of the no-
tion of distributed cognition in analyzing performativity (Hutchins 1995). The important con-
clusion is that economic reality can only be properly understood as a conjunction of brain 
processes and external structures, with institutions being the primordial example. I illustrate 
this with some observations on behavioral finance and the sociology of finance. 
 
2   Performativity and the naturalistic approach to institutions 
 
When we think of stock markets as real, this is by no means an innocuous statement, because 
in a strict sense, economists would not regard any item other than individuals as being the 
ultimate constituents of economic reality. Pure economic theory is reductionist in the sense 
that an institution would only be treated as a property of systems of interaction between hu-
man agents, which are driven by their choices, such that the existence of the institution would 
be entirely dependent on them. This thinking clearly runs against everyday life experience in A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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which we experience institutions as hard facts that we cannot change easily, and which we 
take for granted. This is also a reason why the use of the term vacillates between institution 
and organization, as many institutions also have organizational counterparts, such as in case 
of the law, the police and the courts. Yet, even many non-mainstream approaches to institu-
tions tend to treat institutions as mere epiphenomena of what is primarily a phenomenon lo-
cated within individuals, such as the cognitive models that reflect and support institutions 
(Aoki 2001; 2007). 
2.1  Searle’s theory of institutions 
So, the question is whether institutions are a central piece of the ontology of economics, being 
a part of economic reality in the strict sense (compare Lawson 1997). The philosopher John 
Searle (1995; 2005) proposed a theory of institutions which allows systematizing the afore-
mentioned everyday life experience, in a similar fashion as the move from ideal to ordinary 
language. It is explicitly based on the analysis of language, and simultaneously it advocates to 
state a social ontology, which is much richer than the one normally presumed by economists, 
albeit implicitly. This is what might be called a naturalistic approach to institutions (compare 
Bhaskar, 1989; on naturalism in general, se Papineau 2007). 
Searle’s theory builds on the fundamental distinction between observer-dependent and ob-
server relative facts. A mountain is an example of the latter, a holy mountain an example of 
the former. The mountain exists independently from the human observer, whereas the feature 
of holiness essentially depends on this observer. That example also shows that at a closer look 
things can be really complicated, as we also distinguish between a hill and a mountain, such 
that even the identification of a mountain might be observer relative to a certain degree, as 
different observers might not share the same opinion about the demarcation between those 
two concepts.  
An observer-dependent fact does only exist in terms of its relation with an observer. Yet, this 
does not simply mean that it is subjective. Firstly, the cognitive state in which I assign the 
status of holiness to a mountain is itself an observer independent fact, i.e. a state of the brain 
that exists independently from any kind of observer. Second, certain consequences that result 
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stop in front of it, thus changing the direction of my bodily actions. That means, even though 
an observer relative fact is also based on subjective states, because I myself know and feel 
what it means that the mountain is holy, yet the consequences are objective in the sense that 
they can be ascertained by other individuals, possibly even reaching a scientific consensus. 
This is precisely what happens with a stock market. A stock market is a highly subjective 
phenomenon in the sense that, for example, traders experience a wide variety of emotions and 
cognitive states related to it, and in a fundamental sense its driving forces, the expectations, 
are subjective, as it is very much emphasized by the Austrian tradition of economics. How-
ever, the stock market clearly also is accessible to objective knowledge, such as statistics and 
econometric research building on it. So, the stock market is both, it is observer relative, and it 
is a fact.  
If we look for the central underlying causalities that result into observer relative facts, lan-
guage is the prime mover. This is for two reasons. One is that language involves the essential 
function of representation, in the sense of something representing something else, and the 
rules  how  to  construct  and  manipulate  those  representations.  The  holy  mountain  and  the 
mountain are two totally different entities, which involves very intricate relations, in the sense 
that we can say language assigns the meaning of holiness to the physical mountain, but also in 
the sense that it is the mountain that represents the idea of holiness. That is, in language real-
ity in its entirety is transformed into a system of signs that are related to every other sign via 
semantic connectedness. So we can say that language is a central medium of observer relativ-
ity. However, one should notice that observer relativity does not exclusively presuppose lan-
guage in the strict sense. For example, the shape of a predator is a sign of the predator, and 
being a predator is not simply a property of the animal but only in the relation with another 
animal. This relation involves signs, but we would not say that this is language in the strict 
sense (for more on this, see Ben Jacob et al. 2006). Searle (1995: 121) has an extensive differ-
entiation between different kinds of facts that deals with this point, but we cannot delve into 
the details here. 
The second reason for the analytical primacy of language is that language is essentially social, 
following Wittgenstein’s theorem on the impossibility of a private language (Wittgenstein 
1958; overview of the debate in Candlish 2004). Meanings always relate to collectives of lan-
guage users who follow the rules of language. This implies that language use is always based A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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on forms of collective intentionality, in the sense that if Ego utters a sentence, this implies a 
directedness of mind in terms of the relations with Alter, the intended meaning of the utter-
ance and so forth, and that this only works if there is some pre-established joint understanding 
about precisely this directedness (for a psychobiological background on this, see Tomasello et 
al., 2005; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007). Wittgenstein’s theorem implies that language use 
is only possible as based on collective intentionality. In most simple terms, the subject of lan-
guage use is never an I but always and necessarily a We, in the most fundamental sense of 
meanings that necessarily have to be shared in order to enable successful communication. It is 
precisely this property of language that turns linguistic facts into observer relative facts in the 
ontological sense, as we experience language as something external to us, which we can ma-
nipulate and distort, yet precisely even in those actions we need to rely on accepted language 
uses.  
Now, in Searle’s theory of institutions the precise functioning of language can be formalized 
in the so-called status function. A status function has the form <X counts as Y in context C>, 
thereby assigning a certain function to Y. Status functions presuppose collective intentionality, 
as in the case when a collective agrees to assign the function of money to a certain kind of 
pieces of paper. How this collective intentionality emerges, does not matter in our current 
context (for an extensive philosophical account, see Tuomela 1995). But it is important to 
notice that status functions, viewed in an evolutionary perspective, normally go back on some 
functions that are related with ”brute facts“ (Searle 1995: 55ff.). In the case of money, early 
forms of money may build on certain physical properties of certain metals, for example. The 
possibility to treat a piece of paper as money, results from the fact that the pertinent status 
function is embedded into an evolved complex system of complementary institutions. Thus, a 
gate may serve to block access to a private estate, but even the open gate does not imply that 
access is now permitted in terms of the underlying status function of the gate. 
The pivotal role of status functions in a theory of institutions is evident if one considers the 
fact of recursivity which results from their linguistic nature (Ingram 2007: 33f.). Status func-
tions can be combined and nested in an infinite way, in the same vein as language is infini-
tively creative. Thus, Y in context C can count as Z in context C’. This phenomenon of recur-
sivity, for example, lies behind the evolution of kinds of money, such as giral accounts being 
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cial markets. Further, status functions are constitutive, that is, they go beyond the mere regu-
latory role of institutions, which is often overestimated in economics. For example, institu-
tions governing money do not simply regulate the use of something that does already exist 
independent from those institutions. This is an especially important distinction when it comes 
to the analysis of the evolution of institutions. For example, fishing might be a primordial 
activity of human hunters, which they share in principle with other mammals, such as bears. 
In human groups, this activity might be regulated by institutions, which, for example, govern 
the right for the first catch, or the use of certain instruments and ways of fishing. In modern 
fishing, however, there is a further transition in the context of the governance of fish re-
sources. One can argue that the activity of fishing is substantially transformed into a market 
that is superimposed as an artificial construct on the primordial activity, in a similar way as 
paper money supersedes the use of gold coins (Holm and Nielsen 2007). What is being fished 
is a right on a resource, but not the fish in the primary sense. In many other cases, and cer-
tainly in the case of financial markets, institutions are purely constitutive, as the underlying 
traded items do not exist independently from the institutions. This corresponds to the Witt-
gensteinian notion of the language game, that is, economic activities come into existence in 
the same way as the game of chess comes into existence with the rules, and not by the crafting 
of its figures. 
The final ingredient of Searle’s theory is the notion of power. One can say that the litmus test 
of  an  observer  relative  fact  is  causal  power  (compare  Bhaskar  1989).  Thus,  inflating  the 
money supply triggers a causal chain of events in the economy, which are objective. In most 
contexts, causal power in social interactions is related to the power of an agent to do some-
thing, and where the means are limited to constrain this action. Thus, if the judge judges me 
guilty, I have to live with the consequences. The judgment is the cause why I stay in prison 
now, beyond the mere physical actions of the police and the physical structure of the prison. 
This causal power is based on the power that is assigned to the judge via the pertinent status 
function which assigns this role to a particular individual. Ultimately, this sort of power is a 
form of deontic power, which flows out of the collectively-intentional acceptance of certain 
rights and obligations. More specifically, this is the so-called power creation operator, which 
has the form <We accept (S has power(S does A))>. So, if via a status function an entirely new 
object is created, e.g. a share that is traded on the stock market, this also comes with a certain A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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allocation of power to the owners of the shares, for example, in relation to the management of 
a public company. 
This observation completes the sketch of Searle’s theory. The upshot is that institutions are 
not simply mental phenomena, such as the coordinated beliefs in some game-theoretic con-
ceptions of institutions which describe institutions as equilibria (Schotter 1982). In Searle’s 
theory institutions are part and parcel of a social ontology that is partly independent from our 
beliefs, yet essentially refers to Us. The notion of performativity helps to clarify this intricate 
relation. 
2.2  Performativity and the creation of economic reality 
Searle’s theory of institutions gives a clear account of why we consider institutional facts as 
facts in the ontological sense, i.e. as observer relative facts. Money is not simply a reflection 
of the beliefs and choices of agents. Money exists and the proof of its existence are its causal 
powers. An illuminating illustration of this fact is money illusion, which should not occur in 
an ideal economy of the general equilibrium sort (Shafir et al. 1997). Yet, money has autono-
mous causal powers, which might in turn be explained even by neuropsychological theories 
(Weber et al. 2009). 
We can now relate these insights with the notion of performativity which plays a central role 
in the sociological literature. Clearly, uttering a status function for the first time is a performa-
tive speech act in the sense of creating a social fact. So, if an individual works as a judge, this 
goes back to the original act of nominating her as a judge, which includes a performative 
speech act, mostly spoken and written. 
As I have mentioned in the introduction, performativity is mainly discussed in the context of 
economics as a science. This does not constrain the theoretical implications, as we can view 
economics just as a special dialect in language in general. There is an intricate debate over the 
question how far certain economic propositions are performative, and others are not. The bone 
of contention is whether economics just describes its object of research, the economy, or 
whether it also contributes to its very existence. I think that this debate is mainly related with 
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approach.  Some  economic  institutions  refer  to  activities  that  are  partly  independent  from 
them, such as raising a pig (which can also be done in an entirely different setting, such as a 
religious ritual). Other economic institutions create activities that do not exist independently, 
such as trading stocks. Hence, economics will also play different roles when economists set 
up hypotheses about economic processes. There will be cases where the economic proposi-
tions merely describe a pre-existing economic process, and others, where economics is heav-
ily involved in creating the very process that these hypotheses purportively describe. The no-
tion of performativity is therefore substantially different from both the merely expressive or 
descriptive role of economics and its prescriptive role because both would presuppose a pre-
existing process. 
In order to make this point as neat as possible, I briefly consider the example of economic 
statistics. This also allows for the extension of the argument beyond economics in the narrow 
meaning, thus including all possibly pertinent status functions. That means, an economics 
based status function would be, for example, to treat the stock market as an efficient market in 
the sense of the standard model of finance. A broader sort of status function would include the 
pertinent laws, which are not a part of economics proper. 
In the case of statistics, we might be justified in maintaining the strong assumption that this is 
the part of economics that allows direct access to economic reality, as it stands, independently 
from economics in most current practices. An example is agricultural statistics (Didier 2007). 
Even though this results into a complex conceptual transformation of the primary goods ac-
cording to certain procedures of classification and counting, one still cannot really say that the 
underlying objects do not exist independently from the economic statistics. Hence, agricul-
tural statistics seem to express the underlying economic reality, and does not perform it. Now, 
consider another vital statistics, which is unemployment. As it is well known from the diffi-
culties  in  measuring  unemployment  in  less-developed  agricultural  economies,  the  modern 
notion of unemployment is heavily influenced by the underlying institutional framework for 
the registration of the unemployed. Once economic theory adds to the picture, we realize that 
this is a case of the performative function of institutional actions and economics. This is evi-
dent from the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment, and hence the 
fundamental difficulties to measure the true rate of unemployment unequivocally. This goes 
back  to  the  underlying  analytical  framework  of  the  market  system.  In  a  New  Keynesian A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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framework, for example, there are many arguments that might explain why wages may be in 
constant disequilibrium states, and, in particular, why they might be downwardly rigid, such 
that the economy consistently fails to reach the equilibrium point. This has serious implica-
tions for the measurement of unemployment, because a wage rate above the equilibrium wage 
rate will increase the labor supply. This results into a fundamental identification problem in 
the measurement of unemployment (fig. 1): If unemployment is just the gap between labor 
supply and demand, the measured unemployment includes two different parts. One is the pure 
effect of the decline of the demand for labor, which measures up to the supposed equilibrium 
value of full employment, and the other is caused by the additional supply of labor, which 
would disappear in the equilibrium state. Thus, if the economy were treated as a GE system, 
in figure 1 the true volume of unemployment is just section ab, whereas the measured unem-
ployment rate includes bc, hence unemployment which is voluntary, in the sense of a supply 
of labor that would not appear in the equilibrium state. 
 
Figure 1: Performing unemployment in disequilibrium 
In this example, we clearly have a transition from a mere regulatory institution to a constitu-
tive institution: Unemployment may be seen as a fact that is independent from economics, but 
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wheat in agriculture. In modern societies unemployment is a social fact that essentially de-
pends on the institutional framework and we can also identify a possible performative role of 
economics. This shines up in the dependence of the statistical measure of true unemployment 
(involuntary  unemployment)  on  the  economic  theory  that  is  projected  onto  the  economic 
processes. That is, all members of society could agree on performing the economy following 
the economic theory, which would entail a major redefinition of the employment statistics. As 
long as we stick to the current practice, the measure of unemployment also performs the 
economy in a particular way, thus including both voluntary and involuntary unemployment in 
its measure. 
In the sociological debate, the most famous and extensively researched example of performa-
tivity in this sense is the evolution of financial markets and particular segments, such as de-
rivatives trade (MacKenzie 2006, 2007). Again, we deal with a phenomenon that is reflected 
in raw data, such as prices of derivatives and volumes of trade. However, in this case the raw 
data play an important role also in determining the behavior of the economic agents, who 
need to build expectations about future values of assets. This is particularly crucial in option 
pricing. One of the central contributions to the modern theory of finance was the Black Scho-
les formula in option pricing that seemed to have solved the problem how to determine those 
prices, depending on certain expectations about the future value of the underlying assets. 
The Black Scholes formula is a foremost example of performativity in economics because in 
the early years it certainly failed as a description of observed raw data on option pricing. So it 
did not really express or describe asset markets. However, with the emergence of that formula 
and other theories in modern finance, in particular the capital asset pricing model, it operated 
in a performative way in two different senses. One sense, and not only relating to this formula 
but to the entire body of the standard theory of finance, is that regulatory bodies increasingly 
accepted the theory, as well as agents on the markets, who pushed institutional and organiza-
tional innovations. This implied a convergence with the conditions of application inhering the 
theory, in particular, the most basic conception of a perfectly competitive market. Further, and 
specific the Black Scholes model, market agents started to use the formula as a device to de-
tect deviations from the expected value and actual value in order to exploit arbitrage opportu-
nities. Clearly, this introduced a sort of reflexivity in the institutional evolution, because this A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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way to build expectations created forces that indeed drove the option prices into the direction 
of the “right price“, as identified by the Black Scholes formula.  
Although it is tempting to interpret this as a self-fulfilling prophecy, it is none, as the concept 
of counter performativity shows. The Black Scholes formula gained progressively in validity 
until the stock market crash of 1987. Afterwards, it was problematic and was modified sub-
stantially, which also broke the direct connection between the agents’ actions and the regular-
ity described by the formula. The crucial issue, also significant in the context of the current 
financial crisis, was the underlying assumption about the shape of the statistical distribution 
underlying  asset  prices.  The  Black  Scholes  formula  used  a  standard  normal  distribution. 
However, the much more frequent occurrence of rare events on the asset markets reveals that 
this is a misguided assumption. So, we do not have the case of a self-fulfilling prophecy here 
because the stochastic structure of the financial markets is not influenced by the way how the 
expectations are formed.  
This does not undermine, however, the notion of performativity, but just to the opposite, it 
shows  how  performativity  is  indeed  an  aspect  of  a  social  ontology  in  which  observer-
independent and observer relative facts intermingle. Performativity does not mean that any-
thing goes. There is a reality of economic systems which might even lead to the failure of 
performative acts. In speech act theory, this is called the conditions of felicity in linguistic 
communication. 
To summarize, and pulling the two theoretical approaches together, we can say that performa-
tivity relates to actions underlying the collective expression of status functions in the econ-
omy. Once the Black Scholes formula started to diffuse among market agents, their actions 
converged on a particular kind of collective intentionality that involved a simultaneous inno-
vation, namely the creation of markets for options, beginning in Chicago in the year 1973. 
However, presumably no market agents would just have believed that this market is only a 
matter of coordinated subjective beliefs. Instead, they accepted the reality of the market, for 
example, in terms of analyzing and responding to its volatility. Yet, the very property of vo-
tality itself could not be measured atheoretically, that is, required the essential reference to the 
Black Scholes model. So, we have the clear cut case of a conjoint reality, essentially connect-
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tive processes were also externalized to a substantial degree, as many traders would not really 
understand the theoretical content of the formula, but were relying on artefacts created by 
Black himself, i.e. calculatory devices that made the essential parameters for action directly 
accessible to the traders. Thus, the theory and the reality were just one complex construct that 
emerged from the status functions.  
So, the notion of performativity provides the micro-foundation for the status function, i.e. 
relating collective phenomena with individual behavior. To complete that microfoundation, 
we need an alternative approach to rationality, which can be provided by cognitive science. 
 
3  The cognitive foundations of performativity 
 
I will now turn to the cognitive processes that underlie the status functions. The argument on 
performativity builds on a special linguistic function, which is the status function in Searle’s 
terminology. This status function is a metaphor, in the most general sense, because it implies 
that a representative relation is established between two linguistic signs. We have already 
discussed this in the case of the example of the holy mountain. One cannot really say that the 
physical thing “mountain“ is treated as holy, but in fact it is the linguistic sign for that physi-
cal thing that is given another meaning. Therefore we can say that the mountain represents 
holiness, or vice versa, that the holy mountain sign represents the mountain. In the count as 
formula, both Y and X are linguistic expressions, in the sense of representations. 
In the recent two decades, in linguistics and in cognitive science the role of metaphors has 
been increasingly recognized as a central function of language (Lycan 1999; for a survey, see 
Pinker 2007). In computational models of language and thought, metaphors do not play any 
role, because the semantics is given, and there is a strong emphasis on syntax. Recently, this 
relation has been turned upside down, as some researchers now argue that the metaphorical 
function is foundational, and the syntactical function only secondary. One of the crucial ar-
guments rests on the complexity of the notion of identity, which is taken for granted in com-
putational models with even a tautological status (A=A), but is in fact a foundational issue in A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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semantics,  which  relies  on  networks  of  mutually  dependent  meanings,  and  where  fuzzy 
boundaries of meanings and mutual definitions play a constitutive role. 
One theory of that kind has been proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (2002). I concentrate on 
their  approach  as  it  is  most  straightforward  to  relate  with  performativity.  Fauconnier  and 
Turner argue that all cognitive processes build on conceptual blending and that the computa-
tional approach gets this fundamentally wrong. Conceptual blending occurs both in concept 
formation and in syntactical combination of concepts, as in linguistic utterances. This is not 
the place to delve into the very complicated and immensely rich field of linguistics and cogni-
tive sciences here, where all this is, of course, the object of intensive debate (see e.g. Ritchie 
2004). So I just treat their theory as one possible choice among competing theories which still 
await final evaluation, and which seems to make most sense in the context of our main topic. 
Therefore I leave the relation between syntax and conceptual blends aside, which is not di-
rectly relevant for our discussion. 
A conceptual blend happens if two different concepts are projected onto a common frame of 
reference, such that a new concept emerges that manifests some, but not all features of the 
original concepts. Thus, conceptual evolution might be imagined to proceed from some most 
basic concepts to the more complex ones, even though this is only a merely analytical conven-
ience, because for a certain set of concepts at a particular point of time, all concepts relate 
synchronically, independent from their presumed diachronic order of emergence. This is the 
reason why science can end up in totally different conceptualizations of fundamental concepts 
such as time, than purported in the original concepts. 
There are different kinds of blends, with different degrees of structural complexity. All blends 
can be described as conceptual networks with directed relations. For example, a simplex net-
work is just a projection of an abstract reference frame on a particular input space. The most 
interesting case is the double-scope network, which is also most relevant for our analysis of 
performativity.  In  a  double-scope  network,  two  input  spaces  are  projected  into  a  generic 
space, such that the blend does not retain all properties of the input spaces, that is, it emerges 
as a novelty not only as a concept, but also regarding the specific combination of manifest 
properties. Clearly, this allows for the construction of new blends if that first blend is then 
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A standard example for this is the metaphor of time as space, which is briefly sketched in 
figure 2 (adapted from Fauconnier and Turner 2008). In the original input spaces, time is re-
garded as a linear sequence of events, which manifest a certain rhythm, such as the sequence 
of sunrise and sunset. Space is regarded as the medium of movements with large degrees of 
freedom in the directedness. The two input spaces can be projected into a generic space, 
which is motion. Motion is an abstract frame that combines action in space with the flow of 
time. Via this projection, conceptual blends become possible, which relate to particular kinds 
of motion, such as circular motion. Thus, the original linear sequence of sunset and sunrise 
can be seen as a circular motion, thus ending up with a concept of a day as a closed circle of 
movements of the sun. Once a day is conceptually defined, it can be projected into other ge-
neric spaces, such as rhythm, which allows for the division of a day into smaller segments of 
equal duration, and so forth. 
 
Figure 2: Time as space (modified after Fauconnier and Turner, 2002, 2008) 
I posit that this kind of analysis helps to further dissect the status function in institutional 
emergence. Clearly, a status function must be based on the projection of two input concepts X A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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and Y onto a generic space, the context C, that allows for the emergence of the institution as a 
blend between the two. In this sense, Searle’s approach is lacking an important part of the 
cognitive science story that is actually hidden in his notion of context. This is because in fact 
the context and the generic space cannot be simply the same. I come back on this in the next 
section. Let us just fix right now that the status function as such is the conceptual blend, in the 
sense of being an explicit description of the process of blending. 
There is an excellent example in the sociological literature on performativity which allows 
specifying this internal semantic structure of a status function. This is the emergence of a for-
eign exchange futures market in Chicago in the early 1970, which prepared the institutional 
setting for the rapid growth of international forex exchanges after the demise of the Bretton 
Woods system (MacKenzie 2006: 143ff.) and was part of an across-the board liberalization 
and deregulation movement that ended up in the modern system of financial markets that ran 
into the crisis of legitimacy in fall 2008. 
Futures did exist for long in the markets for agricultural commodities. Until the late 1960s, 
however, the institution of futures trading was not transferred to the forex market, correspond-
ing to the general opinion of the time that financial markets tend to speculative disorders, and 
even markets in general, which also had rendered the agricultural futures markets dysfunc-
tional because of widespread government intervention into the price mechanism. Obviously, 
there was a belief that between commodities and currencies there is a substantial difference, 
which would prohibit the transfer of concepts from agricultural markets to currencies. This 
difference was reflected in a frame competition, i.e. a vascillation between different generic 
spaces, as conceived in the Fauconnier and Turner approach (see fig. 3). One frame would be 
based on the abstract features of <agricultural futures markets>. A projection of both agricul-
tural commodities and currencies on that generic space would have immediately allowed for a 
new blend of a <forex futures market>, that could have been translated into a corresponding 
institution. However, this blend was impossible to achieve because most actors believed that 
the proper generic space for that projection would have been<gambling>.  
Actually, for the forex market only a simplex network held, which directly equated any kind 
of activity that does only involve money as gambling (for a detailed historical analysis, see 
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of final commodities actually takes place, that is settling accounts by netting out balances was 
not legal, because that would have opened the way for gambling activities. Since in purely 
monetary transactions netting out is a direct result for mere convenience, they were straight-
forwardly seen as gambling. The historical roots of this special frame projection lies at the 
turn of the 19th to the 20th century, when the Chicago Board of Trade launched a campaign 
against competitors which started to offer contracts over future prices of agricultural com-
modities, thus actually providing the opportunity to bet. The crucial argument against this 
business model was that delivery of commodities does not take place, so it was a purely 
monetary deal. As such, it fell under the accepted definition of gambling, which was en-
shrined into many state laws in the following decades. In fact, agricultural futures trade very 
soon did not imply actual delivery to a large extent, but that did not matter for the extension 
of that practice to purely financial transactions. What counted was the mere physical possibil-
ity of delivery, which was obviously even impossible for the case of index based derivatives 
and other financial innovations that later emerged in the 1970s. 
 
 
Fig. 3: The emergence of forex futures as frame competition 
So, the emergence of forex futures markets as a new conceptual blend was blocked for many 
decades. This only changed in the late 1960s, mainly for two reasons. One is that a change of 
perspective on the issue of deliverability took place. Since in foreign exchange transactions 
the original denomination of the different currencies is maintained, one could argue that in A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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fact delivery happens at least in principle, in the shape of the different currencies in kind. Si-
multaneously, for other derivatives it was also recognized that actual delivery would even 
destabilize the markets, as actual transfers would affect the underlying asset prices, as in the 
case of index futures. The other reason was the increasing acceptance of the neoclassical equi-
librium view of the forex market. 
This second phenomenon is a clearcut example of performativity of economics. Whether the 
forex market actually follows the theoretical premises of equilibrium theory, is still an open 
issue today. But once it is accepted, the neoclassical theory works similar to the Black Scho-
les formula in the sense that orderly speculators will accept the theory and form their expecta-
tions according to it, ending up in a behavior that leads back to equilibrium. Historically, this 
transition to a new view of markets was directly pushed by some eminent economists of that 
time who also had a strong influence on regulators, in particular Milton Friedman. 
As these examples show, performativity is not confined to economics, and this is why the 
extension of the approach via Searle’s theory of institutions is worthwhile. The general point 
is that language manifests the property of ontological creativity, in the sense that language 
creates things, both in the sense that linguistic concepts are things, but also that these things 
are conjointly externalized with other things. The famous example in case of the Black Scho-
les formula are the spreadsheets that Black created for the convenient use of options traders 
who could overview with a glance the implied theoretical options prices without doing any 
calculations by themselves, or even understanding the formula. Thus, the adoption of the 
Black Scholes formula as a frame was also accompanied by the diffusion of artefacts that 
supported a reality of action emerging from the use of the formula. 
I propose to generalize this in the way that linguistic artefacts play a central role in processing 
uncertainty on the marketplace, and in doing this, they also support the fixation of an open 
future, in the sense of ultimately co-determining the realization of one of the possible worlds. 
From that perspective, the concept of institution is also extended to include all forces on mar-
kets that lead towards the emergence of structures that systematically correlate concepts and 
material phenomena, such as technologies or firms as material arrangements of people, physi-
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Thus, the approach of conceptual blending can also be used to provide a micro-foundation for 
the approach in organizational ecology which assigns a central role to “organizational forms“ 
in the evolution of industries (Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Hsu and Hannan, 2005). Again, this 
can be seen in the larger context of Searle’s theory in the sense that, according to the organ-
izational ecologists’ methodology, an organizational form relates to sets of audiences who 
observe, evaluate and communicate over organizations and industries. From that perspective, 
an organizational form, such as the notorious microbreweries, which are one of the work-
horses of that literature, is in fact a part of a status function in which a certain population of 
firms is treated as representing an organizational form. When new business models emerge 
for the first time, as in the case of the dotcoms, there were still many uncertainties regarding 
the definition of the industries, the identification of the most characteristic business processes 
or the accepted patterns of organizational structure. This raised the uncertainty regarding the 
valuation of their stocks considerable, as we shall see below. Once an industry evolves, forms 
settle down, in the sense that there is an emergent implicit consensus in the pertinent audi-
ences what the typical forms look like. Audiences include different circles, from government 
regulators over employees to customers. The form is very significant as it normally defines a 
default position, that is, once an organization has been identified as having the form, search 
for further information might be stopped, that is other properties are taken for granted (Han-
nan et al. 2007: 78ff.). Organizations that do not fit into the form will face much more diffi-
culties in getting funding, increasing market shares etc. Thus, the form is a central piece in 
understanding market dynamics in terms of variation and selection.  
Behind the emergence of forms, we can posit again the functioning of conceptual blends. This 
is straightforward to show if we focus on the level of single agents who actually utter the per-
formative statements that coalesce into a collective status function. For example, the Faucon-
nier and Turner approach can be applied for all analytical schemes used on financial markets 
to predict the future, especially in the context of emerging new business models. Ehrig (2009), 
building on earlier work by Beunza, gives an account for the uses of frames in the work of 
analysts which also shows the working of conceptual blends (fig. 4). During the dotcom bub-
ble, analysts faced the difficult task to present valuations of newly emerging business models 
for which no direct past experience was available. The new technologies allowed for business 
processes and forms of customer relations that did never exist before. In the field of finance, A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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this required a complex interaction with investors who might not be fully informed about 
those technologies. That is, again, we do not have a simple case of self-fulfilling prophecies 
here. No investor can just push a technology by amassing venture capital if there are objective 
reasons why ultimately the technology does not hold its promise. But at the same time, the 
technology can fail if the investors’ expectations are not coordinated successfully, in spite of 
being feasible in principle. Analysts play an important role here. So we have another case of 
competing frames, in the specific sense of a competition among analysts who utter performa-
tive statements. Some of these statements ultimately prove to be true and become building 
blocks of the new organizational forms. 
 
Figure 4: Performing a new business model: The case of Amazon (modified after Ehrig 
2009) 
Indeed, in the case of dotcoms, many analysts presented their arguments in terms of meta-
phors. In this case, analysts set up a frame in which the new business was compared with an-
other, already existing form of business. For example, when Amazon entered the market, ana-
lysts  were  not  able  to  assess  its  business  model  unequivocally.  So  a  frame  competition 
emerged on the market for financial advice. Some analysts compared Amazon with a book 
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puters. The resulting forecasts for future returns and hence stock value predictions were vastly 
different. The two frames were actually claiming two different kinds of reality. Once one had 
settled,  actions  between  investors  and  entrepreneurs  were  coordinated  successfully.  This 
marks the emergence of a new, now generally accepted business model, the electronic book 
dealer. 
Clearly, the form is another example for a status function, so that we can say that industries 
become institutionalized. In the organization ecology literature, there is also a strong empha-
sis on deontic aspects of forms, as they provide legitimacy for a wide range of business ac-
tions, and the assign specific sets of rights and obligations to market actors. Once a form of 
dotcoms was established, industries could be re-arranged and a new form of high-tech busi-
ness was born. This also applies for the decline of organizations. For example, many analysts 
today agree on the decline of the newspaper. The newspaper is a clearly defined organiza-
tional form, with a specific kind of professional life, a relatively fixed product structure and a 
stable composition of readers. The newspaper is threatened by the new forms of news proc-
essing and presentation in the WWW. As we see again, performativity does not simply mean 
self-fulfilling prophecies, but relates on conditions of felicity, which might undergo funda-
mental changes for the case of newspapers. 
To summarize, I have now demonstrated how performativity is based on a particular kind of 
cognitive functioning, which is conceptual blending. Much could be added to this, as concep-
tual blending is also supported by generalized cognitive functions. With regard to this aspect, 
there are already approaches also in institutional economics that can further undergird the 
analysis of performativity. This is especially true for certain psychological regularities of cog-
nition, which, for example, have been systematized by Gestalt psychology (Schlicht 1998). 
The emergence of organizational forms, for example, will be supported by the tendency to 
impose consistency and clarity on the forms, thus adding a generalized creative function in the 
sense that still imperfect forms, once being recognized as emerging, will be autonomously 
perfected into complete schemes. This process contributes, amongst other aspects, to the crea-
tion of formalized definitions of forms. Fauconnier and Turner also propose that cognitive 
blends ultimately rely on neurophysiological process, about which some general hypotheses 
can be formulated. This is the final building block that we need to understand performativity. A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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4  A neurophilosophical perspective on performativity 
 
I now turn to the more speculative part of this paper. So far we can state that language is cen-
tral to the construction of economic reality, precisely because language is not just a mental 
phenomenon, but externalized in a community of language users. Language and other eco-
nomic entities are deeply correlated, thus constituting what we perceive as everyday economic 
life. This perspective on language is the familiar one of the linguist, who clearly treats lan-
guage as an artefact, including the correlation between that artefact and brain processes (In-
gram 2007: 3ff.), but is so far rarely invoked by economists, who, if at all, tend to emphasize 
language as a purely mental phenomenon, and hence focus on the dimension of meaning, 
which in the next step easily drifts toward hermeneutics. 
4.1  Externalism, mental phenomena and institutions 
Surely language is a mental phenomenon, too, but what is a mental phenomenon? The modern 
philosophy of mind is an extremely complex field, so I cannot even touch the heated discus-
sions there. Again, I just opt for one approach, which seems to enjoy acceptance by many 
leading protagonists in the field. This is the basic assumption of brain-mind monism or the 
rejection of Cartesian dualism (e.g. Dennett 1991). If we take this as a basic proposition, this 
has the immediate implication that we need to posit that there must be a neuronal correlate to 
the process of conceptual blending, and that there must be a neuronal correlate to the external 
uses of language in a community of language users. In other words, it does not make sense to 
denote as language a set of brain states as corresponding to what we call a mental phenome-
non, but language is by definition a conjunction between neuronal and external phenomena. 
This is not a statement of fact, but a beacon towards which our thinking about these matters 
has to be directed. It does not necessarily imply reductionism, as monism can be emergentist 
(Bunge 1979), which in contemporary philosophy is mostly covered by the notion of mental 
processes supervening on brain processes. 
Recently, economics seems to tend towards a related paradigm, which is neuroeconomics as a 
basis for analyzing human behavior. There is an ongoing discussion about the significance of 
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is discovering brain mechanisms that directly explain a certain behavior. However, this dis-
cussion does not take the modern philosophy of mind into consideration. Subsequently, I wish 
to show that a neuronal approach to performativity does not imply reductionism in the neu-
roeconomics sense, but ends up with exactly the opposite. This is based on the position of 
externalism  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  and  boils  down  to  the  extended  brain  hypothesis, 
which  corresponds  the  distributed  cognition  approach  in  cognitive  science  (for  a  general 
overview over these different fields, see Wilson 2004). In this context, we can set up a non-
reductionist, yet monistic paradigm. 
Externalism posits that it is impossible to refer to mental content without invoking facts ex-
ternal to the mind or the brain (for a survey, see Schantz 2004). In our context, the prime ex-
ample is language, as the concepts of language are bound to a community of language users 
which is by definition external to the individual brain. Insofar as language is a significant as-
pect of human thought, this means that mental content is external. From this follows that neu-
roeconomic research can never generate any substantial insight about behavior without taking 
external facts into consideration. There is no such thing as an ultimate neuronal cause of be-
havior, as all neuronal phenomena operate in conjunction with phenomena that reach beyond 
the physical boundaries of the skull. One should emphasize that this is not a somewhat more 
complicated statement of the old idea that language refers to external objects as meanings. In 
one version of externalism, which I follow here, the category of meaning is seen as superven-
ing on causal loops between internal and external physical events, which are themselves com-
pletely free of any notion of “meaning“ in the traditional sense, and this is reconstructed as a 
proper functioning in the context of evolved structures into which those causal loops are em-
bedded (on teleosemantics, see MacDonald and Papineau 2006a, and more generally, Mil-
likan 2005). In a nutshell, the concept of meaning is dissolved into the notion of function as 
an outcome of an evolutionary process through time (Dretske 1995). 
There is a relatively short and convenient bridge between those foundational issues and the 
topic of performativity, which can be built via Searle’s theory, again, and which helps to clar-
ify an earlier point made with regard to the need to complement Searle’s theory by a more 
explicit cognitive science approach. Searle (1995: 113ff.) argues that status functions are by 
no means necessarily accessible to conscious reflection, in the same way as an experienced 
player of soccer will never think about all the rules of the game when playing, except from A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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very exceptional circumstances. Searle posits that status functions presuppose a comprehen-
sive set of background conditions in the neurophysiological system, which he calls abilities or 
capacities. In principle, we can say that these background capacities are the crucial factor that 
enables individuals to activate a status function with reference to a particular context. So, the 
notion of the background correlates contextual phenomena, hence the environment, with in-
ternal neurophysiological processes. This relation is a causal structure  and is independent 
from what we naively understand as a mental phenomenon, in the sense of thinking about an 
object. For example, via a long process of exercising soccer we reach a state in which our 
neurophysiological apparatus manifests the capacities to act according to the rules of the game 
with only rare interference of conscious thought. Searle claims that this is also the case for all 
institutions in society, so that rule-following is not a process that can be described in terms of 
choices and conscious acceptance and awareness of rules, but has to be understood as a causal 
loop between environmental cues and the activation of behavioral dispositions, which produce 
a behavior that an external observer might describe via the status functions. This means, in 
particular, that rule following is a kind of proper functioning within a certain social structure, 
and does not need to be based on the category of meaning in the traditional sense. This corre-
sponds exactly with Wittgensteins deconstruction of that category in his notion of rule follow-
ing in language games, so that we have a precise correspondence between an externalist ap-
proach to language and an externalist approach to institutions. We close the argument by add-
ing the notion of performativity, which explicitly defines the kind of action that emerges from 
this kind of causality. Performativity would take the conceptual position that is left vacant if 
we abandon the notion of rational rule following. 
Following an institution is performing an institution, and hence manifesting causal processes 
that produce a functional interdependence between the environment and the brain. Thus, per-
formativity is the central concept to understand the co-evolution between brain and environ-
ment. 
This idea of co-evolution between environment and agents is a classical position also in evo-
lutionary biology, though not a part of the Neodarwinian synthesis. There are more or less 
radical versions of it. Generally speaking, the bone of contention is where the biologically 
relevant information is actually located, and even, what the very notion of biological informa-
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trine and posits that all relevant information is located in the genotype. Alternative positions 
assume that there are different degrees in which this information is also externalized to the 
environment. For example, DNA methylation patterns are transmitted via the cell environ-
ment and not via the DNA replication directly. One of the most elaborate positions in this 
regard is the developmental systems approach (Oyama 2001). This implies that the unit of 
evolution is the system of genotype, phenotype and environment, and that there are essential 
transmissions of information via the environment in which an organism is located. In this re-
lation, the genetic factors do not necessarily have a precise and unique determined function or 
meaning in the sense of the content of the information, but are related to interpretive proc-
esses that correlate environment and the genetic system (Jablonka and Lamb 2006). 
This argument is a direct formal correspondence to externalism in the theory of mind. In both 
cases, the notion of a basic unit of information carrying meaning is abandoned in favor of the 
notion of an evolved functional interdependence between the environment and the respective 
information processing physical structure (genotype or brain), such that meanings can only be 
assigned to the systemic level, but not to the constituent level. Regarding mental content, and 
coupled with the monistic position, this results into the hypothesis that there must be a con-
junction between brain processes and environmental entities in the sense that both constitute a 
unity.  
Thus, the general evolutionary framework applies for both the genetic level and the level of 
language, which is in turn central for the understanding of institutions. I have to leave this 
analysis for another paper, so I just point out one important aspect. This is the analysis of 
creativity, hence the event of new performative acts in the context of language and institu-
tions. Dispositions in relation to institutions do not imply that behavior will always and neces-
sarily manifest the exact patterns that would correspond to the reconstruction of a status func-
tion by an external observer. In contrast, we stay on firm ground of brain science if we assume 
that those dispositions, firstly, will not be identical across individuals, as all individual human 
brains are unique, and secondly, that individual brains will always produce random variations 
in the neuronal processes that produce the behaviors (Edelman 2006). Thus, there is always a 
source of behavioral variety which can evolve into new patterns of behavior and, ultimately, 
leads to the emergence of new institutions. In the context of the brain sciences, it is straight-
forward  to  interpret  human  creativity  as  reflecting  ordinary  functions  of  the  brain  (Hesse A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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1990), without the need to invoke higher level entities such as the human genius. However, 
we need to maintain the externalist bottom line: To analyze human creativity, it is not suffi-
cient to understand the human brain as an evolutionary system of its own in which random 
neuronal firings ultimately coalesce into regular patterns and structure (Neuronal Darwinism 
as proposed by Edelman 1987 or Calvin 1998). Those very fundamental brain processes are 
already connected with environmental factors in the different time dimensions, that is phylog-
eny, ontogeny and present action, such that internal selection of what is left as the only purely 
autonomous neuronal process, i.e. random firings, is always deeply interlinked with the exter-
nal environment. This is the extended brain/mind hypothesis (compare Sterelny 2004).  In 
other words, without an external anchor the brain would implode into a self-referential solip-
sistic structure without any fix-point in its random neuronal firings. This external anchor is 
provided, among other factors, by the recurrent interaction with other brains, mediated via 
language as an artefact (which has been proposed by Edelman 1987 right from the beginning). 
This is a mere sketch of the foundational approach towards performativity that would relate 
external linguistic phenomena, such as status functions and its constitutive entities, with cog-
nitive processes, such as particular cognitive blends, and neurophysiological structures, in an 
externalist approach to the human mind. Instead of further exploring this point in a systematic 
fashion, I wish to present an empirical case to complete the argument in this paper, taking up 
the red thread of analyzing modern financial markets.  
4.2  Financial markets and brains: some preliminary observations 
The externalist approach to institutions would imply that we cannot simply analyze financial 
markets just in isolating one of the two sides, that is, either the rules governing the behavior 
of agents, or the agents themselves as rational agents. In the actions driving financial markets, 
dispositions of agents and institutions form a unity. Financial markets are performances in the 
strong sense. What is missing in the familiar statement of the sociology of finance is an ex-
plicit treatment of the microfoundations, reaching through the level of cognition to the level of 
neuronal processes. This is possible once we consider the close relation between conceptual 
blending theory and the neural theory of metaphor that has been developed over the past 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 123 
 
At a closer look, there are also different groups of agents that might behave differently in the 
context of what we superficially perceive as homogenous financial markets. That means, the 
actual outcome will also differ across different groups. This is today the bread and butter of 
behavioral finance research, which shows that many agents do not behave as the standard the-
ory of rationality and efficient markets prescribe. Let me briefly analyze how we can enlarge 
the scope of behavioral finance by the approach presented in this paper. 
As a first step, we have to show that there is a correlation between external phenomena on 
financial markets and brain processes. There are already many insights how, for example, the 
introduction of new artefacts on financial markets such as credit cards produces distinctive 
behavioral patterns because of a different kind of causal connection with the underlying brain 
processes. That is, there are certain correlates of dispositions and environmental cues, which 
are changed or even broken when for some reason the environmental cues change their nature. 
Economists so far do not recognize this as they just posit the rational agent as the best ap-
proximation of a market agent, which implies that, for example, the distinction between credit 
cards and cash should not matter at all, as the former are merely a different way of realizing 
cash transactions. In fact, however, credit cards produce anomalies in behavior which show 
that most agents do not perceive them in the same way as cash. As Laibson (1997) has theo-
rized still without reference to brain processes, that might be explained by hyperbolic time 
preferences which imply that people perceive the losses and gains from spending money very 
differently depending on whether they give cash away or use a credit card. Meanwhile, there 
are many neuroeconomic results that show how hyperbolic time preferences relate to distinct 
activation patterns in the brain (McClure et al. 2007). This boils down to the observation that 
the artefact of money as cash is differently connected with brain processes than credit cards. 
There are institutional differences between the two as behavioral dispositions that correlate 
with the artefact differ. In the case of money as cash, there are strong empirical reasons why 
we can assume that money directly produces utility, thus contradicting established views on 
the perfect neutrality of money (Camerer et. al. 2005). That is, the institution of money corre-
lates with a strong disposition to view money as something valuable on its own sake. Indeed, 
human cultural history reveals the emergence of this pattern in the many myths and religious 
beliefs about money in human social life. Today, neuroeconomics demonstrates that money, 
contrary to the expectations of the economist, activates the same dopaminergic circuits in the A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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human brain as other pleasures, such that psychologists also simply can use money in experi-
ments as a direct reinforcer (e.g. Knutson et al. 2007). As the psychologists Lea and Webley 
(2005) have it, money in modern societies is a mix of a tool and a drug. This easily explains 
why people behave differently when spending cash and using credit cards, because in the for-
mer case the loss aversion toward losing money is strong, whereas in the latter case the im-
mediate gains loom large and the losses are postponed to a more distant future. 
This example shows why the hypothesis of the rational agent is ill-suited to understand the 
interaction  between  behavior  and  institutions  on  financial  markets.  There  is  accumulating 
evidence about causalities that involve human neuropsychological characteristics in the be-
havioral responses to certain institutional arrangements that may have been set up by rational-
constructivistic action. There is a need to systematically ground this in the theory of performa-
tivity. In the case of credit cards vs. cash, which should be substitutes in an efficient market 
with rational agents, in fact we observe different performances, based on different correlates 
between external artefacts and behavioral dispositions. Thus, the different institutions of cash 
and money produce different phenomena even on the macroeconomic level, such as different 
savings rates. 
This role of performativity even holds for the most fundamental analytical categories in fi-
nance theory. Turner (2008) analyzes risk in terms of a conceptual blend between <Harm> 
and <Chance>. Chance refers to uncertainty as such, denoting the scope of possibilities. Harm 
is a negative evaluation of an outcome. Blending the two results into the more complex notion 
of <Risk>, the two dimensions are not only independent from another, they can also be put 
into the context of other frames, such as thrill-seeking behavior.  
Now, the point is that in recent neuroeconomic research there have been insights into the 
complex structure of risk processing in the human brain, where there is a distinctive spatial 
pattern in the differential activation of expected value and variance (for an overview, see 
McCabe 2008). Further, the well–known hypothesis of loss aversion in prospect theory also 
can be supported by differential activation of brain areas, as we have seen. That means, there 
is some evidence pointing towards a direct mapping between the structure of a conceptual 
blend  and  brain  activity,  even  for  foundational  theoretical  categories  of  economic  theory. 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 123 
 
havior towards risk, might in fact be a behavior that builds on status functions, i.e. is institu-
tionalized to a large degree. Such a direct mapping between concepts and brain activation 
patterns can also be supported by another sort of research, which is the sociology of finance, 
again. 
In the sociology of finance there is extensive research on the emotional patterns of behavior 
that underlie trading (Zaloon, 2003, 2004; Hassoun, 2005). This is a far cry from the rational 
agent hypothesis, but directly supports evidence for Searle’s concept of dispositions in the 
context of behavior towards risk. Evidently, the high speed of decision making on the trading 
floor and the immense pressure requires a behavioral stance that is mainly guided by emo-
tional reactions which are built on the long experience of becoming a professional trader. This 
even includes behavioral disciplines which constrain the effects of otherwise possibly detri-
mental emotions, such as the aforementioned loss aversion. Thus, it might be emotions that 
finally enable traders to act in a rational fashion, and not rationality as an agent property. Ra-
tionality emerges as a correlate between dispositions and the peculiar environment of the trad-
ing floor. This includes a central role of a large range of environmental clues, such as the spa-
tial structure of a trading pit, the body language of traders or the metaphorical embeddedness 
of the language of traders in a male-centered world of violence, thrill and sex.  
This brief observation concludes the circle of the argument presented in this paper. This is 
because emotions play a central role in evolutionary psychology as the coordinating forces in 
an otherwise chaotic and fragmented brain (Tooby and Cosmides 2005). Clearly, this exactly 
matches with the notion of a disposition in Searle’s approach. Emotions as higher-level neu-
rophysiological structures organize the brain in terms of dispositions that link up behavior 
with external cues in a regularized way. This is precisely what we observe when we learn that 
the trader who enacts the equilibrating arbitrage on a neoclassical market is in fact a person 
who manifests complex emotional responses in a highly dynamic environment, that, almost 
paradoxically, might end up in a conjunction between individuals and institutions that in fact 
produces  the  pattern  of  rationality  that  is  just  presupposed  in  the  economic  theory  as  an 
axiom. However, this also implies that we cannot assume that everybody behaves in a similar 
fashion, as the conjunction of dispositions and environmental cues is the outcome of a social 
selection process. A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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These  analytical  sketches  demonstrate  how  we  can  complete  the  theory  of  performativity 
against the background of externalism in the theory of mind. The empirical counterpart con-
sists in constructing direct causal feedback loops between external artefacts, including lan-
guage and neuronal processes. There are several high-powered theories already available that 
provide for this linkage, such as Lakoff’’s (2008) neural theory of metaphor. This theory pos-
its a number of structural and process-related characteristics of the brain, which correspond to 
the conceptual analysis of cognition. Concepts are seen as arrangements of neuronal groups 
which are overlapping and organized into higher-level circuits, such as Gestalt circuits, which 
manifest a particular mechanism which allows for the activation of an entire circuit if only a 
partial sensorimotoric input arrives. The different sorts of circuits are built on the fundamental 
mechanisms of mutual activation or inhibition that channel the flow of networking in a neural 
system. For the analysis of the cognitive processes that underlie status functions in institu-
tional theory, two larger structural features of connections in the brain are crucial, mappings 
and bindings. Maps are projections across different brain areas, bindings establish a unity be-
tween more simple constituent units which can also relate with independent concepts.  
The dynamics of this system is guided by a small number of principles, of which the best-fit 
principle is very important for the evolution of conceptual structures. The best-fit principle 
means that the brain maximizes connectivity, under the constraint of given inhibitory relations 
between neural substructures. This is the force that underlies Gestalt dynamics and the crea-
tion of meanings from contextual clues. As a result of these different dynamics, the brain can 
build more complex linkages between simple mappings and bindings, which in turn can be 
the object of further mappings and bindings. At the same time, if only for stochastic reasons, 
those structures can be continuously reshuffled and recreated. 
If we embed this theory into the externalist framework, we can conceive linguistic artefacts 
and other artefacts as triggers on neuronal processes that cause outputs which are in turn proc-
essed within the brain and its environment. In particular, artefacts of language play a central 
role in coordinating neuronal processes via their outputs across individuals. 
According to this theory, we can make systematic sense of case studies such as on cash versus 
credits cards. The different artefacts trigger different neuronal processes. It seems that cash is 
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circles. So cash seems activate neural groups via strong bindings. Credit cards are different, so 
that they might activate mappings that accentuate current satisfaction from immediate con-
sumption. A credit card is a metaphor for expanded consumption opportunities. Thus, neurol-
inguistic approaches give a view on human economic behaviors that is very different from the 
established view of standard economics and provide a foundation for behavioral finance. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented an argument that crosses different areas of research and even scien-
tific disciplines. The starting question was what are the constituents of economic reality? The 
answer is: economic reality is an ordered set of neurophysiologically rooted behavioral dispo-
sitions, conceptual structures and external patterns in the environment, with language playing 
a central role in the emergence and maintenance of institutions. This complex picture results 
from a synthesis of different existing approaches in the literature, reaching from Searle’s phi-
losophical approach to institutions over Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual blends 
to recent approaches in neuroeconomics. 
The central concept that serves to arrange these different theories into a conceptual whole is 
performativity. Economic reality is a performance. This does not mean that it is just free-
floating as a result of unbound human imagination. I argue in a naturalistic framework, in 
which meaning is equated with evolved proper functions, so that it manifests a wide range of 
constraints that exert impact on specific evolutionary paths of change. 
There are many implications for economic methodology and method. In conclusion, I just 
want to highlight one that refers to the recent rise of neuroeconomics (see also Herrmann-
Pillath, 2009). On the one hand, the proposed approach offers an additional strong reason why 
neuropsychological research is foundational for economics, and that the axiomatic approach 
to rationality is doomed to fail if economics is expected to be an empirically grounded sci-
ence. At the same time, however, this cannot mean that neuroeconomics can explain even the 
simplest aspects of human behavior, if it only focuses on the brain as object of research. Hu-A neurolinguistic approach to performativity in economics 
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man brains are extended brains, in the sense that their cognitive functions involve the envi-
ronment in an essential way. In particular, economic behavior always relates internal states of 
the brain (dispositions) with external artefacts, with language being the most important one. 
So I expect that a surprising result of the rise of neuroeconomics will be the completion of a 
linguistic turn in economics, following the track laid by the rise of the philosophy of ordinary 
language in the mid of the 20th century. 
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